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Principles, Not Fictions
Cass R. Sunsteint
How are courts to interpret statutory enactments? A time-
honored answer is that they should do so by reference to one sim-
ple thing: the statutory "text." Despite its salutary recognition of
legislative supremacy on these matters, the answer will not suffice.
The meaning of any "text" is a function not of the bare words, but
of its context and the relevant culture. Because of the context,
words sometimes have a meaning quite different from what might
be found in Webster's or the Oxford English Dictionary. Courts do
not and should not "make a fortress out of the dictionary."' Even
more important, the culture furnishes the interpretive principles
that courts and other interpreters use in order to give meaning to
any "text." Legal words are never susceptible to interpretation
standing by themselves, and in any case they never stand by
themselves.
The actual and appropriate role of interpretive principles in
legal interpretation remains one of the great unresolved areas of
the law. But this much seems clear: some such principles are not
subject to change or even to evaluation. They are simply part of
what it means to be a lawyer, or even to speak the English lan-
guage; they serve as conventions that determine meaning. Thus,
for example, the notion that "animals" do not include inanimate
objects, that Congress is (usually) not joking, that things that do
not move are not "vehicles," and that interpreters should not con-
strue statutes to mean whatever (they think) a good statute would
say are taken as axioms, and rightly so.2 But some interpretive
principles conspicuously reflect deliberation and choice.
t Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of Politi-
cal Science, The University of Chicago. I am grateful to Larry Lessig, Richard Posner and
Simon Steel for extremely helpful comments on a previous draft.
' This aphorism is Learned Hand's. See Cabell v Markham, 148 F2d 737, 739 (2d Cir
1945).
2 To use a classic illustration, a provision barring vehicles from a park would be con-
strued not to apply to a statue of a tank. Indeed, a statute barring animals would not re-
quire public officials or private citizens to eliminate rodents. See text at notes 10-16, dis-
cussing statutory ambiguity.
Some of these principles are not, however, simply part of what English words mean.
The idea that courts should not understand a statute to accomplish whatever they want it
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Consider, for example, the following ideas: courts will not gen-
erally infer private rights of action from silent statutes; judicial re-
view is presumed available; courts will defer to agency interpreta-
tions of law; statutes will be construed generously toward Indian
tribes; a clear congressional statement is necessary to support dis-
placement of state law.3 These are simply a few examples of the
dozens of interpretive principles that can be found in even a casual
reading of any two or three volumes of the United States Reports
or the Federal Reporter. All of these principles reflect substantive
judgments, and all of these judgments should be brought out into
the open and evaluated.
In an earlier essay on this subject, I attempted to outline the
actual and appropriate place of the conventional sources of inter-
pretation, to describe the role of interpretive principles in statu-
tory construction, to catalogue various kinds of principles, and to
propose principles to be used in interpreting regulatory statutes.4
In their stimulating and thoughtful response,5 Eben Moglen and
Richard Pierce assemble three principal objections to my proposed
approach. First, they argue that my approach would confer exces-
sive power on the federal judiciary. Second, they claim that my
approach suffers, even more than the alternative positions, from
incompleteness and indeterminacy. Third, and perhaps most pro-
vocatively, they object that any interpretive system rests on "fic-
tions" and that I use the wrong criterion to evaluate the competing
fictions. I am grateful to Moglen and Pierce for their valuable reac-
tions. In this reply, I discuss their objections in turn.
to requires an argument rather than a language lesson. In a democracy, however, the argu-
ment is so straightforward that it need not be reconsidered or assessed very often. The
problem with conventionalist approaches to interpretation is that they assimilate all inter-
pretive principles to the category of conventions, and thus treat practices that require justi-
fication as simply parts of language. See, for example, Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes
Naturally (Duke, 1989). In their use of the notion of "fictions," Moglen and Pierce's ap-
proach appears to bear some resemblance to conventionalism. See Eben Moglen and Rich-
ard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein's New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of Statutory Intepreta-
tion, 57 U Chi L Rev 1203 (1990).
3 See, for example, Karahalios v National Federation of Federal Employees, Local
1263, 489 US 527 (1989) (implied causes of action); Johnson v Robison, 415 US 361 (1974)
(judicial review presumed available); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 US 837 (1984) (deference to agencies); Montana v Blackfeet Tribe, 471 US 759
(1985) (statute and treaties construed favorably to Indians); Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer
Affairs v Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 US 495 (1988) (preemption of state law).
' Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv L Rev 405
(1989). The analysis is extended and put in the context of a broader discussion of the aspi-
rations and failures of the regulatory state in Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution:
Reconceiving the Regulatory State (Harvard, 1990).
1 Moglen and Pierce, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1203 (cited in note 2).
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I. THE PROBLEM OF THE JuDIcIA ROLE
With respect to the role of the courts in statutory construc-
tion, I do not believe that there are fundamental differences be-
tween my approach and that suggested by Moglen and Pierce. I
agree that courts must give full scope to the unambiguous meaning
of statutory words. It follows that courts may not invoke contesta-
ble or controversial interpretive principles when there is no ambi-
guity.' In this respect, courts should indeed be faithful agents of
the legislature, subject to the (practically unimportant) qualifica-
tion that the interpretive principles that make unambiguous stat-
utes unambiguous will sometimes be, at least in part, a judicial cre-
ation.' I agree that Congress may displace judicially created
interpretive principles if it chooses to do so.8 I agree that courts
should defer to administrative interpretations where Congress has
told courts to defer. In the event that Congress has not expressly
addressed the issue of deference, I agree with Moglen and Pierce
that courts should generally defer where distinctive administrative
policymaking and factfinding competence is relevant. In this latter
respect, I agree that Chevron was entirely correct. Indeed-and
this is an important point-the interpretive principles I propose
are directed in the first instance at regulatory agencies, not at the
courts.9 In the modern administrative state, it would be highly in-
congruous to direct a set of interpretive principles solely to the
judges who review agency decisions, and not to the administrators
themselves. Where we disagree is on two questions that are not
exactly fundamental, but that do have some practical impor-
tance-the category of statutory ambiguity and the precise degree
of deference to agency interpretations.
6 See Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 464-66 (cited in note 4).
The fact of clarity reflects agreement or consensus about the governing interpretive
principles. When things are clear, it is not as if no such principle is "there"; rather, the
principle is simply taken so much for granted as to be invisible. In such cases there is usu-
ally no need for interpreters to consider the source of the governing principle. The key point
is that everyone accepts the principle and therefore there is no interpretive doubt.
The possibility of consensus suggests that the agency theory of the judicial role contains
a large truth; indeed, it is in significant part correct. The problems are that in some cases
the instructions of the principal are unclear, and in many cases courts should press unclear
statutes in certain directions.
' In some rare cases there might be constitutional obstacles here. Consider, for exam-
ple, an effort by Congress to eliminate clear statement principles calling for express legisla-
tive deliberation on certain issues, as exemplified in the principle that ambiguities in the
area of foreign affairs will be understood not to intrude on presidential power. See Dames &
Moore v Regan, 453 US 654 (1981). But this situation will be unusual.
I Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 504 (cited in note 4); Sunstein, After the Rights Revolu-
tion at 161-62, 232 (cited in note 4).
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A. Ambiguity
I would find ambiguity in some cases in which Moglen and
Pierce think that Congress has spoken clearly. For example, Con-
gress enacted the Delaney Clause in 1955, and thereby banned the
approval of any color additives that "induce cancer when ingested
by man or animal."'10 When Congress enacted the Clause, few car-
cinogens were detectable, and those carcinogens that could be de-
tected were extremely dangerous. By 1989, thousands of carcino-
gens could be detected, and many of them posed trivial risks. In
light of the changed circumstances, the consequence of a literal
reading of the Delaney Clause was actually to increase, not to de-
crease, health risks."
In these circumstances, the FDA found an ambiguity in the
1955 enactment. Taken in its context, that enactment simply did
not speak to the question whether de minimis cancer risks should
be regulated-especially in light of the principle, deeply engrained
in common sense, ordinary language, and law, that a literal prohi-
bition on an activity need not foreclose exceedingly trivial trans-
gressions. (I tell my housesitter to make sure not to get any dust
on the piano. What exactly do I mean by this? Must he cover the
piano with a sheet? The state of California bans the drinking of
alcoholic beverages on college campuses. Does this mean that bot-
tled water with some alcohol content must be removed from Stan-
ford?) I wonder whether it can be argued with any seriousness that
the FDA's invocation of the very old principle "de minimis non
curat lex"-a principle that would actually have saved lives
here-would have violated some congressional instruction. I won-
der too whether it might not instead be thought that the FDA's
decision was entirely consistent with congressional instructions, in-
deed more consistent than a "literal" interpretation of the Delaney
Clause.
Moglen and Pierce also invoke the Benzene case, in which a
plurality of the Court found an implicit "significant risk" require-
ment in the OSHA statute. 12 The literal reading apparently fa-
vored by Moglen and Pierce would have required OSHA to regu-
late any risk posed by any toxic substance, no matter how trivial
the risk and no matter how high the costs. A fifty billion dollar
10 21 USC § 348(c)(3)(A) (1982).
11 For a more detailed explanation, see Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution at 88-89,
198-99 (cited in note 4); Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U Chi L
Rev 407, 418-19 (1990).
12 Industrial Union Dept. v American Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607 (1980).
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expenditure to save one life per decade would be legally mandated.
The consequence would be grotesque overregulation of some risks
and predictable underregulation of others."3 I doubt that Moglen
and Pierce really believe that a court that so held would be follow-
ing some actual congressional instruction.
In both of these cases, Moglen and Pierce understate the in-
terpretive problem posed by generality, which can indeed produce
ambiguity. In a famous passage, Wittgenstein made the point:
"Someone says to me: 'Shew the children a game.' I teach them
gaming with dice, and the other says, 'I didn't mean that sort of
game.' Must the exclusion of the game with dice have come before
his mind when he gave me the order? 14 The example reveals that
adherence to dictionary definitions can produce poor interpreta-
tions. In the law, the point is an old one, long predating Wittgen-
stein. Indeed, many cases reflect the same principle. 15 My support
for the outcome in Benzene and my criticism of the Delaney
Clause case are thus nothing new.
I should reiterate that I do not believe that our disagreement
on these matters goes to anything fundamental. Where there is no
ambiguity, courts must defer. To say that generality creates ambi-
guity is not really to repose an "extraordinary degree of policy-
making power"1 ' in the federal judiciary. It hardly allows courts to
refashion statutes however they wish. It simply acknowledges that
generality can produce an interpretive problem.
B. Deference to Agency Interpretations
Moglen and Pierce would give greater scope than I would to
the principle that courts should defer to administrative interpreta-
tions of laws. They do not say exactly how far they believe this
principle extends, but if we disagree, it must be because they think
that that principle should apply (a) even in the face of counter-
vailing principles and (b) even in cases involving pure questions of
law in which agency bias or self-dealing is involved. In both of
these categories of cases, I believe that the principle of deference is
inappropriate.
" For an explanation, see Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution at 91-92, 106 (cited in
note 4); Sunstein, 57 U Chi L Rev at 418-19 (cited in note 11).
14 Ludwig Wittgenstein (G.E.M. Anscombe, trans), Philosophical Investigations 33
(Basil Blackwell, 1953).
'5 For examples, see Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 420 nn 44-47 (cited in note 4).
" Moglen and Pierce, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1223 (cited in note 2).
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The first point here is that the principle of deference, stated
most prominently in Chevron, is one of a large number of interpre-
tive principles. Under current law, and under any reasonable sys-
tem of interpretation, it does not stand by itself, or even at the top
of the list. Suppose, for example, that an agency's interpretation of
an ambiguous statute raises serious constitutional doubts, or en-
sures that its own decisions are unreviewable, or preempts state
law, or unfavorably affects the Indian tribes. It is implausible to
think that the agency's view would or should prevail in all such
cases. In cases before and after Chevron, the rule of deference has
not been applied in at least some contexts in which competing in-
terpretive principles argue against the agency's view.17
Second, the key question on the problem of deference is
whether Congress has instructed courts to defer. Sometimes Con-
gress will not have answered that question directly, and when this
is so, courts must reconstruct legislative instructions on the basis
of an assessment of judicial and administrative capacities. In cases
involving agency bias or self-dealing with respect to pure questions
of law, it seems unlikely that Congress would want courts to defer
to agencies. Suppose, for example, that the question is whether the
agency is under an affirmative obligation to take action against
pollutants shown to cause serious harms. In view of Congress's con-
stant effort to force agencies to take action in this area, it seems
difficult to sustain the idea that agencies should be able to decide
whether their own duties are mandatory.'" Or suppose that the
question has to do with the extent of an agency's own jurisdiction.
When Congress has not spoken on the matter, ought courts to as-
sume that agencies have the authority to decide on the extent of
their own legal authority?
Whether or not my conclusions are correct on these points, it
hardly seems right to suggest that exceptions to the rule of defer-
ence-for countervailing interpretive principles or agency bias in
cases of pure questions of law-would produce anything but a
modest increase in judicial power over administrative processes.
These exceptions ought to be regarded not as an effort to increase
the authority of the judges, but as a natural outgrowth of the fun-
damental idea that the authority of the administrators is
subordinate to that of Congress.
17 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum L
Rev - (forthcoming December 1990), and cases cited therein.
1 For a more detailed and precise discussion of these and related issues, see generally
[57:12471252
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II. PROBLEMS OF ADMINISTRABILITY
Moglen and Pierce believe that the system of interpretation
that I propose is too complex for judicial adoption. In their view,
some of the suggested norms are unjustified, or at least controver-
sial (with "less than universal acceptance" 19); the system contains
too many norms; and some of the relevant norms are highly gen-
eral and subject to conflicting interpretations. All in all, Moglen
and Pierce conclude, the system fails because of its un-
manageability. Let me take up these claims in sequence.
Some of the norms that I propose are certainly controversial.
This is true, for example, of the norm in favor of narrow construc-
tion of statutes endangering property rights and the norm in favor
of aggressive construction of statutes protecting the environment
and endangered species. But the fact that a norm is controversial
does not by itself count as a good argument against it. Surely some
norms that are widely accepted within the existing legal culture
ought on reflection to be abandoned; surely some norms now un-
supported by a consensus ought to be accepted soon. The phenom-
enon of rejecting old norms and importing new ones has of course
occurred during nearly every decade of American law. The cate-
gory of interpretive principles is not static but is instead a product
of a continuous process of evaluation and choice.
Whether interpretive norms are acceptable depends not on
consensus but on the reasons that can be marshaled on their be-
half.2 0 In all likelihood the reasons I have offered for the many
norms I discuss are frequently too thin, and in any case it would be
surprising if every one of the norms for which I have argued can be
supported by reasons that should ultimately be found persuasive.
But this is not a question on which Moglen and Pierce spend much
of their time, and surely there is considerable room for further
thought here.
Moglen and Pierce are correct in suggesting that many of the
norms I propose are not self-interpreting and that there is a seri-
ous potential for conflict among the norms.2 But it is important to
19 Moglen and Pierce, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1227 (cited in note 2). Moglen and Pierce also
ask whether the category of norms is intended to be closed or exhaustive. Id at 1233-34.
Although the enumeration of syntactic norms is designed only to be illustrative, the institu-
tional and substantive norms I develop are in fact intended to be complete, though it would
be most surprising if, on reflection, additional norms did not appear justified.
20 Note here that I am discussing norms with substantive foundations, and not syntac-
tic norms, which are founded on the rules of grammar. Of course, a decision to reject an
established norm or to bring about a new one must be based on reasons.
21 Moglen and Pierce, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1233-45 (cited in note 2); see Sunstein, 103
Harv L Rev at 443, 497-98 (cited in note 4).
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understand that my effort to propose norms for the regulatory
state is descriptive as well as normative. All of my proposed norms
have some basis in current law. Almost all of them have been ex-
plicitly recognized as such in the cases.22 In view of the fact that
some version of this system is already in place, and indeed has
been in place for many years, Moglen and Pierce's claim of lack of
administrability seems at least overstated.
More broadly, almost any approach to interpretation will con-
tain norms that are on occasion susceptible to competing interpre-
tations and in potential conflict with one another. This is true in
ordinary linguistic practice as well as in law. The fact that an ap-
proach to interpretation (normative or positive) contains a multi-
plicity of norms, some of them necessarily stated at a high level of
generality, does not count as a powerful argument against it. At
most, that fact is a reminder, salutary to be sure, of the inherent
limitations of any effort to describe the "principles" of interpreta-
tion in a systemic or mechanical way.2"
The only way to reduce the risk of conflicting interpretive
principles is to produce a system with one or very few such princi-
ples-as in, for example, the idea that agency interpretations will
always prevail, or that ambiguous statutes will always be inter-
preted favorably to the plaintiff, or that courts will resolve hard
cases unfavorably to those whose names begin with the letter fall-
ing first in the alphabet. But the dangers of simplicity in this set-
ting should be self-evident. Any simple system will contain an
unacceptably high potential for an unacceptably large number of
errors. And one might make this point while agreeing, with Moglen
and Pierce, that one goal of a system of interpretation is to reduce
the complexity, unpredictability, and cost associated with interpre-
tation.24 It is of course possible that the system I propose is either
too simple or too complex for descriptive or normative purposes,
and that some alternative system would have a better level of com-
plexity. But this would call for a long discussion.
One final point. We should think of the process of statutory
interpretation as an exercise of practical reason, not as mechanical
22 See, for example, cases cited in note 3. The exceptions include the norms in favor of
generous construction of antidiscrimination measures and against exemptions from welfare
programs.
22 Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 497-98 (cited in note 4).
24 See also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 Duke L J 511; Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Impli-
cations of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action,
87 Colum L Rev 1093, 1117-29 (1987).
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or deductive.25 Since statutory interpretation requires practical
reason, it is inevitable, and no cause for embarrassment, that the
operative principles, stated at a certain level of generality, are
themselves subject to interpretation and in potential conflict with
one another. To outline the relevant principles and to provide
some sense of their relationship is indispensable for descriptive or
normative purposes. These steps structure inquiry. They foreclose
some routes and open others. But they do not decide concrete
cases. An outline of the principles and their general operation is
the beginning, not the end, of the process of interpreting any par-
ticular statute in any particular context. The applications have to
be discussed and thought through; here there will be room for dis-
agreement and uncertainty.
15 See Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 497-98 (cited in note 4); see also William N. Es-
kridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan
L Rev 321, 322 (1990); Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Harvard, 1990).
For an especially helpful treatment outside of the legal context, see Martha C. Nussbaum,
The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy ch 10 (Cam-
bridge, 1986).
I do not have space to explore all of the (extremely interesting) cases discussed by
Moglen and Pierce, but it might be helpful, as an illustration, to say a few words about the
question whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can or must avoid "scrub-
bing" strategies for utilities emitting sulfur dioxides. See Moglen and Pierce, 57 U Chi L
Rev at 1235-38 (cited in note 2).
I believe that the EPA is unquestionably authorized to reject scrubbing strategies if it
can show (as it can, and to some extent did in Sierra Club v Costle, 657 F2d 298 (DC Cir
1981)) that other approaches can produce equal or greater environmental protection at
lower cost. This conclusion is a natural product of (a) the norm in favor of considering
systemic effects, which argues powerfully against scrubbing strategies (such strategies per-
petuate the life of old, especially dirty plants and impair technological innovation), see Sun-
stein, 103 Harv L Rev at 480; (b) the norm in favor of avoiding interest group transfers-of
which scrubbing strategies, benefitting eastern coal without improving the environment, are
an egregious example, id at 486-87; (c) the norm in favor of giving the statutory text priority
over the legislative history, id at 474-75; (d) the norm in favor of according deference to the
policymaking competence of the agency, id at 475; and (e) the presumption against irration-
ality, id at 482-83. The norm in favor of aggressive construction of statutes protecting the
environment does not argue against this result, since scrubbing strategies do not protect the
environment more than the alternatives, other things being equal.
While the question is a bit closer, I also believe that a universal scrubbing strategy, or
something like it, would be unlawful even if the EPA endorsed that strategy. The only dif-
ference is that norm (d) would argue in the other direction, but I do not believe that the
agency view should be accorded deference in this setting, where the outcome would not be
compelled by the statutory text, would be irrational, and would conspicuously reflect inter-
est group pressures rather than sensible efforts to protect the environment. For more discus-
sion, see Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution at 85 (cited in note 4); Bruce A. Ackerman
and William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air (Yale, 1981). A particularized analysis of this
sort, deploying the norms in a reasoned rather than mechanical way, would be necessary to
resolve the various cases that Moglen and Pierce discuss.
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The risk of uncertainty and the need to attend to particulars
do not count as a criticism of a system of interpretation that em-
bodies such a set of principles. To demand more is to demand
something that such a system simply cannot provide, and that it
should not attempt to provide even if it could do so.
III. FICTIONS AND PRINCIPLES
Moglen and Pierce's broadest claim is that I fail "to recognize
the necessarily . . . fictive nature of the enterprise of interpreting
texts. '26 For them, interpretive fictions help make "communication
comprehensible" and "generate rules for understanding speech. 2 7
Indeed, the source of canons of construction "remains fiction.' ' 21
Moglen and Pierce attempt to support this claim by reference to
past and present legal fictions and to a range of conventional ideas
about statutory interpretation that they deem "fictional": collec-
tive intent on the part of the legislature, legislative history, the
assumption that legislators are reasonable people acting reason-
ably, and the principle of deference itself. For Moglen and Pierce,
statutory interpretation is, in these and other contexts, filled with
fictions. For anyone to challenge a principle as fictional, as I do on
occasion, seems no argument at all in these circumstances.
Here there is a genuine disagreement between us. At least in
the context of statutory interpretation, and indeed in the law gen-
erally, I believe that interpretive fictions are unhelpful and in fact
harmful to legal reasoning and results. Fictions are not indispen-
sable. The law would be better off without any of them. Indeed, an
important contribution of twentieth-century jurisprudence has
been a measure of self-consciousness about the existence of legal
fictions, and an understanding that they are obstacles to thought.
We do not need interpretive fictions. Instead we need interpretive
principles-ones that can be defended in substantive or institu-
tional terms.
In each of Moglen and Pierce's illustrations, it is possible to
restate what they call a fiction in a way that identifies a principle,
and one that, once identified as such, merits evaluation. If, for ex-
ample, the principle of deference to agency interpretations is justi-
fied on the ground that Congress intends to give law-interpreting
power to the agencies, it is-just as Moglen and Pierce sug-
" Moglen and Pierce, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1205-06 (cited in note 2).
27 Id at 1208, 1209.
28 Id at 1209.
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gest-based on a fiction. And if this is all that can be said for the
principle of deference, it is wrong precisely because its foundation
is fictional. If the notion of deference to agency interpretations is
acceptable, in the absence of legislative instructions, it is for rea-
sons that call up the comparative advantages of the agency-the
capacity to respond to changed circumstances, administrative ac-
countability and expertise, and other reasons nicely discussed by
Moglen and Pierce themselves.2 9 To make these arguments persua-
sively, there is no need to refer to fictions.
Or consider the notion that interpreters should assume that
legislators are reasonable people acting reasonably. If this assump-
tion is justified on the ground that it accurately captures the legis-
lative process in every case, then its core is fiction. Surely it cannot
be justified in that way at all. But if this premise is defended, in
principle, as a means of improving the legal system by assuming
and thus helping to produce reasonableness and sense rather than
chaos and nonsense, then it seems sound.30 And in that event, the
assumption of reasonableness is not rooted in fictions at all.
So too, if we continue to rely at all on legislative intent and
legislative history, this reliance cannot be because there is in all
cases a unitary collective "intent" or because the legislators know
and consult the legislative history. As Moglen and Pierce suggest,
these ideas are fictions. Fictions, I repeat, cannot justify interpre-
tive practices. If reliance on intent and history is to be continued,
it is because in the face of textual ambiguity, courts should at-
tempt, as part of their interpretive activity, to use whatever evi-
dence is available on the (highly relevant) question of how the
words were understood at the time of enactment and, more partic-
ularly, on what some or many of the people who enacted the text
thought that it meant. It is altogether unnecessary to advert to fic-
tions in order to make this claim.
All this suggests a broader point. Legal fictions are usually
founded on some substantive ground; the problem with the fiction
is that it buries that ground. The way to handle fictions is to un-
cover them as such and to translate them into principles so that
they can be evaluated. When evaluated, and treated as the norma-
tively-laden devices that they are, some of these principles will be
accepted and others will be rejected. A legal system that yields to
the inevitability of "fictions" will be disabled from carrying out
this indispensable task.
11 Id at 1212-14.
3" See Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 435 (cited in note 4).
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I conclude by reiterating that some or even many of my pro-
posed principles might ultimately be found unacceptable and that
the proposed framework may err in the direction of undue com-
plexity or undue simplicity. But whether this is so depends on the
reasons offered for and against the relevant principles and on
whether an alternative system can produce a better mix of good
outcomes, predictability, and low decision costs. I hope that it is to
those concerns, and not to the matter of fictions, that future de-
scriptive and normative work on statutory construction will be
devoted.
